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Religion and class have been the major factors structuring party choice in the 
Netherlands until the mid-1960s. Since then a process of dealignment has 
set in. According to some the old bonds were never replaced. Others claim the 
emergence of new cleavages which would have supplemented or possibly even 
replaced the former ones. Most frequently mentioned are left-right ideology and 
(post)-materialist value orientations. In this article the current structure of 
electoral alignments in the Netherlands is analysed. Left-right turns out to be the 
most important determinant of party choice. Religion and class are still correlated 
with choice, but they exert no strong direct causal influence. Post-materialist 
orientations are of negligible importance in a causal model of party choice. 
1. Introduction 
Election results in the Netherlands appear, for some time past. to have lost their stability and 
predictability. Up to the mid-sixties, voter behaviour could reasonably be accounted for by 
religion and social class (e.g. Lijphart, 1974). Owing to the stability of these characteristics, 
election outcomes resembled each other rather closely. After 1966, election results display 
considerably more change (for a detailed description we refer to van der Eijk and Niembller, 
1985). These changes can be explained only to a limited extent by changes in the 
religious-secular and class composition of the electorate. A large part of the changing 
electoral fortunes of the various parties appears to be an almost uniform swing in many 
different segments of society. As a result the relevancy of religion and socio-economic 
position as dominant factors of party choice has diminished considerably. Whether or not 
one should label such a situation as dealignment or realignment depends upon one’s ability 
to discern new factors with comparable structuring qualities. In this respect Irwin and 
Dittrich delineate the Dutch situation as utter dealignment: ‘Old bonds were loosened and 
not replaced . . For the moment no end seems in sight Dutch elections may become 
even more unpredictable than they have been in recent years.’ (1984: 296, 297) 
In our view, however, their description is only partly correct and as a result they arrive at 
an incorrect conclusion, that is, dealignment. Certainly, since the sixties the traditional 
alignment of party choice with religious and class cleavages has weakened considerably. But 
at the same time another long-term structuring factor has emerged-left-right ideology, 
which accounts for a great deal of voter behaviour, party behaviour, and issue formation (for 
more details refer to van der Eijk and Niemijller, 1983a, 1983b, 1985). Evidently then, in 
addition to dealigning tendencies realigning ones exist as well. Whether or not we can speak 
of a new and different alignment is not yet clear. Notwithstanding its explanatory power 
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left-right ideology does not account for all variation in party choice. This may either be the 
effect of idiosyncratic and short-term factors intluencing voters’ choices or of additional 
long-term aligning factors, be it traditional or new ones. Furthermore, left-right may to 
some extent be related to, or intertwined with, other (older, or newer) aligning dimensions, a 
possibility which may allow different but equally acceptable descriptions of the alignment 
structLire. 
In this article we will analyse the current structure of alignments in the INetherlands. 
taking into account social-structural as well as ideological cleavages which have been 
hypothesized to exert aligning influence. With respect to the factors to be included in the 
analysis one can think of the seven ideological dimensions which, according to Lijphart 
(1981: 25), were present in many democratic party systems in the 1970s and are likely to 
remain in the 1980s: 
1. socio-economic 4. urban-rural 
2. reiigious 5. regime support 
3. cultural-ethnic 6. foreign policy 
7. post-materialist 
According to Lijphart only the socio-economic (or left-right), the religious. and the post- 
materialist dimensions are of importance in the Netherlands. The supposed irrelevance of 
the other four factors is unchallenged in the literature on party systems and party choice in 
the Netherlands. Therefore, we will focus our attention on these three ‘ideological’ 
dimensions and analyse their effect on party choice. In addition we include measures of 
social class and a fen important background characteristics. These additional variables 
facilitate the interpretation of empirical relations and allow examining the relations between 
ideological determinants and voters’ choices for spuriousness. 
In the following sections a number of important theoretical propositions and empirical 
findings will be summarized and used in the construction of a hypothesized causal model 
(section 2). After some remarks about methodological aspects of the analysis (section 3), the 
model will be put to an empirical test (section 4). The principal conclusions will be 
summarized in section 5. 
2. Towards a Causal Model 
In this section we will bring together a number of notions, both conceptual and empirical, 
which play an important role in the discussion concerning the ‘ideological’ determinants of 
voting behaviour. Religion and left-right orientation and their relation nim voting 
behaviour (rather familiar and uncontested phenomena) are only briefly touched upon. We 
will focus mainly on the less known and more controversial hypotheses concerning the role 
of post-materialist orientation in the realm of voting behaviour. 
2.1. Religion 
According to the 1960 census, secular voters comprised 18.4 per cent of the electorate, and 
in the 197 1 census (which is the most recent one) 23.6 per cent are classified as secular. The 
various denominational groups therefore lost some 5 to 6 per cent of the electorate between 
1960 and 1971. In the same period, however, the combined confessional parties lost some 
11 per cent of the national vote. The conclusion is obvious, secularization can at the most 
account for only part of the electoral decline of the confessional parties. Any attempt to 
sketch a more complete picture of the mechanisms involved in this decline, has to consider 
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also the diminished strength of pillarization, that is, the diminished political and electoral 
relevance of religion. In Table 1 (see van der Eijk and Niemoller, 1985) we report the voting 
behaviour of religious and of secular voters at different parliamentary elections. 
Table 1 demonstrates several noteworthy phenomena. First of all. it is evident that 
support for the confessional parties from the secular voters was as low in the eighties as it had 
been in the early sixties. Second, the probability of religious voters supporting confessional 
parties has diminished dramatically since the early 1960s. This process of depillarization 
(i.e., dealignment) took place in the period between 1963 and 1971; as of the early 1970s 
the support of religious voters for confessional parties has not shown any further decline. 
Elsewhere it has been demonstrated that the process of depillarization can partly (but not 
completely) be accounted for by diminishing religious orthodoxy and declining church 
attendance (Andeweg, 1982; van der Eijk and Niemijller. 1983~). Interesting as this may 
be, it does not alter the conclusion that the principle of pillarization (according to which 
membership of a denomination almost automatically entails voting for its associated 
confessional party) has weakened considerably. 
The differences which remain in party choice between religious and secular voters (see 
Table 1) do not necessarily imply that religion still constitutes a significant electoral 
alignment in the Netherlands. In order to be regarded as such, voting or not voting for a 
confessional party should be determined primarily by (the strength of) religious beliefs and 
not by political motivations. In view of this it should be noted that in the Dutch partv system 
the distinction between religious and secular parties is not independent of other differences. 
Religious parties are right wing parties, a phenomenon which has long been established 
(Daudt, 1982) and which became increasingly more pronounced during the 1970s and 
TABLE 1. Religion and party choice. 
Religious voters 
Vote for 
confessional 
party 
(estimated) 1963 and before 70 
1967 55 
1971 45 
1972 42 
1977 47 
1981 50 
1982 41 
Vote for 
secular 
party 
:; 
37 
47 
43 
44 
48 
Secular voters 
Do not vote 
5 
7 
18 
10 
10 
5 
11 
Vote for 
confessional 
party 
(estimated) 1963 and before 3 
1967 4 
1971 4 
1972 3 
1977 6 
1981 5 
1982 4 
Vote for 
secular 
party 
92 
88 
74 
84 
80 
87 
85 
Do not vote 
5 
8 
22 
13 
14 
9 
11 
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1980s (see van der Eijk and NiemGller, 1983a: 249-50 and 1983b). Therefore. the 
question should be addressed kyhether eligious voters who support confessional parties do 
so because of their religious beliefs (in which case we should speak of an electoral cleavage or 
alignment) or because of beliefs of a more direct political nature. most notably left-right 
ideological orientations. In the latter case it n;ould not be justified to considei religion as a 
primary aligning factor: it would rather be considered as a secondary choice criterion.’ This 
question will be addressed empirically in section 3. 
2.2. Lejl --right 
A review of spatial representations of the Dutch political parties which we have presented 
elsewhere (van der Eijk and NiemGller. 1983a) resulted in the conclusion that paramount in 
all analyses since the mid-1960s is the existence of a left-right dimension which is 
employed by voters in their recognition, as well as in their preferences of political parties. 
According to some authors. political polarization along the left-right dimension is 
essentia!ly a reflection of social class conflict, whereby the working class is considered ‘the 
natural base of support for the left’ because of its assumed support for egalitarian change of 
the ownership of the means of production, the distribution of income, and social and political 
conditions throughout society (see Inglehart. 1983a). To the extent that this interpretation 
of left-right is valid, this ideological dimension would largely coincide with the class- 
cleavage which up till the 1960s largely determined the party choice of secular voters 
(Lijphart. 1974). In the empirical analyses to follon we will assess the nature of the relation- 
ship between class and party choice. There we will also address the question whether or not 
left-right can be considered as the political expression of class differences. 
2.3. Post-materialism 
Our review of the literature concerning post-materialism will be rather selective. We will not 
attempt to summarize the various debates, the gradual shifts in emphasis throughout the 
years. the semantic confusion or the rarely defined theoretical discrepancies between various 
authors. Furthermore, we will only look at those parts of theories on post-materialism which 
are directly relevant for the principal aim of this review: to arrive at a parsimonious and 
testable causal model of party choice. Therefore. we will disregard debates concerning post- 
materialism with a considerably wider scope (see for instance the special issue of 
Comparative Political Studies (17:4. 1985) on ‘hlaterialism, Postmaterialism, and 
Changing Value Orientations’). 
We will mainly use Inglehart’s work to derive a structure of hypothesized causal 
relations. and we will refer to other authors only occasionally. Throughout his writings, 
Inglehart exhibits a capacity for pragmatic conceptual flexibility. However, two central and 
guiding principles can be discerned in his work: something like a post-materialist value- 
orientation exists as an empirical phenomenon and that orientation can be operationalized 
by assessing the relative priority which people assign to each item of a battery of 12 (or even 
a subset of 4) items. The concept of a (post)-materialist value-orientation originated from the 
well-known need-hierarchy of Maslow (1954). according to whom human needs can be 
ordered from sustenance needs, by way of safety needs. the need for belonging and esteem, to 
self-actualization needs. Without a substantive argumentation Inglehart dichotomizes this 
ordering into a distinction between post-materialist and materialist value orientations. 
Obviously. in their theoretical formulations the value orientations of post-materialists 
and materialists comprise quite a bit more than only the relative priority which is given to 
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the various items of a battery in a questionnaire. In his more recent publications, Inglehart 
gives many clues about the scope of the post-materialist value-domain (and, by contrast. of 
the materialist domain as well), albeit that he shows in his terminology a tendency to shift 
towards (closely) related concepts and descriptions such as ‘new dimension’, ‘establish- 
ment/anti-establishment dimension’. ‘new politics dimension’. ‘new class’ etc., all of which 
are measured by the same instrument. However. as a result of supposedly changing value 
priorities in Western democracies 
. there is a growing tendency for politics to polarize along a ni>w dimension that 
cuts across the conventional left-right axis. Increasingly, support for social 
change comes from a segment of the modern middle class. This group has raised a 
new set of issues that tend to dominate the contemporary political agenda. The 
environmentalist movement, the opposition to nuclear power, the peace- 
movement, the women’s movement. the limits-to-growth movement, the 
consumer advocacy movement, all of these are manifestations of a political 
cleavage dimension that is only remotely related to conflict over ownership of the 
means of production and traditional social class contlict. (Inglehart. 1983a: 43’1) 
and 
. the rise of environmentalist movements, and environmentalist political parties 
such as the West German Greens. reflects the political expression of post- 
materialist values. (Inglehart, 1984: 530) 
In The silent revolution (1977: 93) Inglehart counters the objection that post-materialist 
values are-simply a reflection of party preference rather than its potential cause. He does so 
by demonstrating that such values are primarily dependent on non-political background 
variables. After controlling for a number of other variables. level of education turns out to be 
the strongest predictor of value type. Almost equally strong is the predictive quality of age 
cohort: both variables ‘rank far ahead of any others in their impact on value type’. 
However, post-materialists have. according to Inglehart. more in common which 
differentiates them from materialists. They supposedly share also a particular niche in 
modern social structures, which is the reason why in the discussion on (post)-materialism 
frequent references are made to a ‘new (or modern) middle class’. or briefly, a ‘new class’. 
This class (sometimes referred to as an elite) is characterized by hign salaries. high levels of 
education and information, and is subsumed under the following census categories: ‘pro- 
fessional and technical’, and ‘managers and administrators’. According to fnglehart, it is 
precisely these categories which display most strongly post-materialist values, so that he 
suggests 
that the rise of postmaterialism and its subsequent penetration of technocratic 
and professional elites has been a major factor behind the emergence of the New 
Class. For this group is distinctive not only in its occupational and educational 
characteristics, but also in its values. And the ideology attributed to the New Class 
reflects postmaterialist values rather closely. (Inglehart. 1981: 895) 
Since the first time that questions purported to measure post-materialism have been 
included in surveys, an empirical relationship has become evident which has since been 
replicated virtually every time: oost-materialists favour disproportionately parties of the left, 
when compared to materialists. To Inglehart, however, this is not at all surprising: 
the theory does not imply that postmaterialists will necessarily identify with 
the left. Indeed (for reasons implicit in the theory) they tend to come from the 
economically more secure strata of society. Insofar as traditional patterns of 
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political cleavage continue to prevail. their social class background tends to link 
them with the right. Their personal values, however. work in the opposite 
direction. They give top priority to values that are fundamentally different from 
the materialist values that have long prevailed in industrial society. Insofar as their 
own goals conflict with prevailing societal goals, postmaterialists are a change- 
oriented constituency. And insofar as the parties of the left are more likely to 
adopt postmaterialist goals. they tend to gain the support of the postmaterialist 
constituency. (Inglehart. 1985: 488-C)) 
No clear-cut picture emerges from the literature with respect to the relation between the 
left-right and materialist-post-materialist dimensions. Sometimes the two dimensions are 
described as ‘largely unrelated’ (Inglehart. 1979: 351) some time later the impressive 
ability of the left-right dimension to assimilate new (that is, post-materialist) issues is 
emphasized (Inglehart, 1983b: 146). Even so. the linkage between post-materialism and the 
left 
depends on what specific parties do. in specific settings. By and large, the 
parties of the left are more apt to adopt postmaterialist policies because they tend 
to be relatively open to social change in general: but there are tremendous 
differences between parties. 
and 
Some time ago, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) spoke of the ‘freezing of party align- 
ments’, arguing that political cleavages in western countries have remained fixed 
in the pattern that prevailed when the working class became mobilized politically 
early in this century. Today, this argument is only partly true [. .] but to the 
extent hat it is. materialist!postmaterialist values are irrelevant o how one votes. 
(Inglehart. 1985: 189) 
Precisely how relevant value orientation is for voting behaviour when left-right and religion 
are also taken into account, will be examined in our analyses. 
2.4. The Causal Mode/ 
Our analyses concern the impact of the three ‘ideological’ factors discussed above 
(left-right, religion and post-materialism) on party choice. This dependent variable is 
indicated by reported choice in the Dutch parliamentary elections of hlay 1981. Party 
choice in a multi-party system is often thought to yield a nominal variable with (in our case) 
some 12 categories (the number of parties). In that form the information would defy many 
attempts at multivariate analysis. More problematic even is the implied conceptualization: 
political parties are regarded as nominally distinct, hence not comparable entities. Such a 
conceptual perspective ignores a great deal of existing knowledge with respect to the (dis)- 
similarities between the various parties. Rather than using this common nominal repre- 
sentation of party choice we employ an ordered one instead: the ideological stance of the 
party voted for, which is obtained by the sample’s average perception of parties’ location on 
a left-right scale.’ This operationalization avoids the conceptual problems mentioned above 
and facilitates multivariate analyses by its interval level measurement. At the same time it 
allows a direct and unambiguous answer to the question whether religious, respectively 
materialist voters support their preferred parties because of these ideological orientations or 
because of an ideological right wing inclination. 
In our summary above, a number of important variables have been specified with 
hypotheses about their interrelations. As exogenous variables education and age were 
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mentioned, and as endogenous variables income, social class, religion, left-right and (post)- 
materialist orientations, and left-right voting behaviour. To arrive at a more structured 
display of the hypothesized relations between these variables, a causal diagram can be drawn 
(Figure 1). In the remainder of this paper this model will be put to an empirical test. Before 
reporting the results of our analyses a few methodological clarifications have to be made. 
3. Methodology 
Our analyses are based on the data of the Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 196 1. a three 
wave, short term panel study. The background variables used in our analysis are taken from 
the first wave of interviews, a few months before the start of the election campaign 
(January-February 1981); all other variables come from the third wave, immediately 
following the election of 26 May 1981. 
All variables are measured by well-accepted and noncontroversial survey questions and 
measurement procedures. For some only ordinal measures can be obtained, others reach 
(near) interval levels of measurement. Below we present for each of the variables a brief 
description of its operationalization, while referring to the codebook of the Dutch Parlia- 
men&y Election Study 1981 (van der Eijk et al., i981) for details.3 
X 1 Education IO-point ordinal scale 
X2 Age 
Yl Vote 
Y 2 Religion 
Y3 Left-right 
l=low.. lO=high(var167) 
exact age in years (var128) 
left-right score of party voted for: this score is the mean 
sample-score for that party 
1 = left . . lO=right (var513. var555 to var565) 
church attendance on an ordinal scale 
1= no religion 5 = at least once a week (var177) 
individual left-right score on lo-point scale 
1 =left . 10 =right (var554) 
FIGURE 1. Model of hypothesized causal relations 
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Y4 Post-mat value orientation. measured by means of the ‘classic’ 12 item 
battery in the manner described by van Deth (1983: i22-3) 
1 = materialist. Z = mixed. 3 = post-materiaiist (var594 to 
var605) 
Y5 SES social class. self image 
5 = upper class 1 = working class (varl73) 
Y6 income net income of respondent’s household on 12.point ordinal 
scale: 
1 = low 12 = high (var 179) 
The 6 endogenous variables (indicated as Y 1 to Y 6) and the 2 exogenous ones (X I and 
X2) vield 6 structural equations which are specified by the causal relations depicted in 
Figure 1. These equations. in combination with a number of common assumptions regard- 
ing the linearity of relations, independence of error terms etc. (see Saris and Stronkhorst. 
1984) allow us to estimate the parameters and to test the fit of the entire model by means of 
the program LISREL V (see Joreskog and Sorbom. 1981). As some of the variables are 
measured only ordinally, product-moment correlation or covariance matrices are not proper 
as input for the LISREL analysis. Instead, for each pair of variables the most appropriate 
coefficient is calculated, that is: 
product moment correlation for a pair of continuous variables (in our case. variables with 
10 or more categories were considered to be continuous) 
polychoric correlation for a pair of discrete variables 
polyserial correlation for a mixed pair 
4. Empirical Results 
The empirical information for our analyses consists of the set of correlations described in the 
last section; they are displayed in Table 2. 
Inspection of this matrix of bivariate (zero-order) correlations reveals a number of note- 
worthy phenomena: 
*A clear relation exists between left-right self-rating. (post)-materialist value orientation 
and religion on the one hand and voting behaviour on the other hand. These interrelations 
concur with the results reported in the literature mentioned above. 
*Left-right self-image. religion and (post)-materialist value orientation are also relatively 
strongly correlated with each other. In order to distinguish real effects from spurious 
relations, we need a more advanced method than mere bivariate analysis. 
*The correlations between the various background variables and the ideological 
dimensions are not very impressive. The same holds true for the relations betKeen back- 
TABLE 2. Correlations between variables included in the model. 
Vote 
Religion 
Left-right 
Post-mat 
SES 
lncome 
Education 
-%e 
Yl 1.00 
Y2 0.47 
Y3 0.77 
Y4 -0.43 
Y5 0.26 
Y6 0.14 
Xl 0.00 
X2 0.13 
Yl 
1.00 
0.49 1.00 
-0.32 -0.45 1.00 
-0.06 0.14 0.01 1.00 
- 0.04 0.01 - 0.04 0.39 1.00 
-0.19 -0.12 0.22 0.59 0.34 1.00 
0.19 0.21 -0.23 - 0.05 -0.20 -0.36 1 .oo 
Y2 Y3 YA Y5 Y6 X1 x2 
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ground and voting behaviour. The zero-order correlations give no clue as to whether there 
are direct causal effects or indirect ones, mediated by intervening variables such as the 3 
ideological dimensions. The distinction between direct and indirect effects can only be made 
by means of multivariate analysis. 
Application of LISREL leads to the conclusion that the model depicted in Figure 1 does 
not fit the data without adaptation: some modifications have to be made to arrive at 
acceptably fitting empirical models. Such modifications consist of deleting not-significant 
effects on the one hand, and adding to the model those effects which would improve the 
overall fit significantly and which are theoretically acceptable and interpretable. Because all 
parameter estimates are affected by changes in the entire set of effects, such modifications are 
implemented only in a stepwise fashion, evaluating the results after each deletion or addition 
of an effect. We will not report all separate steps which have led to the final model. Instead we 
will comment on the final model, which fits the data acceptably and which is presented in 
Figure 2. 
A comparison of the hypothesized model (which was based on a review of the literature) 
and the empirically fitted final model leads to the following observations: 
1. The empirical relations between the three ideological dimensions and the background 
variables only partially confirm the hypotheses derived from the literature reviewed in 
section 2: 
Left-right position of voters is to a certain extent determined by their social position, 
but the effects are not very impressive quu magnitude. The hypothesized effect of income 
on left-right does not even materialize in a statistically significant way. Substantively this 
means that voters’ left-right position may not be regarded as a mere reflection of their 
social position. 
The causal effects of background variables on post-materialist orientation are so small that 
very little of its variance is explained by them (less than 10%). In addition it should be 
noted that the sign of the importance of income is opposite to what the theory on post- 
materialism predicts. Higher incomes are not more, but slightly less post-materialist in 
character. 
FIGURE 2. Final model (df= 6, chi’= 10.30, prob. = 0.11) 
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Religion remains largely (95 %) unexplained by background variables, the only significant 
effects originate from age (as was expected) and education (which is not surprising either). 
As the model was not designed to explain (strength ot) religious beliefs. this low explained 
variance is no particular cause for concern. 
2. The relations between social background variables and voting behaviour are partly 
direct causal effects (namely from SES and income). partly indirect effects (education, 
income, age and SES) with the 3 ideological dimensions as intervening variables. All the 
signs of the direct effects are as expected, the magnitude of these effects is small. 
3. The most important adaptations of the hypothesized model concern the addition of 
effects between three ideological orientations (religion, left-right and post-ma:erialism) 
themselves. The effects of religion on left-right and of left-right on post-materialism are 
particularly strong ones. It is also noteworthy that the relation between these two 
dimensions can only successfully be modelled as recursive,” meaning that their causal 
relation is not a mutual one. Substantively. we can conclude that post-materialism is not 
causally independent of left-right, and that the assumed ability of left-right to ‘assimilate’ 
post-materialist values is not supported by the data (this hypothesis requires the direction of 
the causal connection to run the opposite way than it does). 
4. As is clearly illustrated in Figure 2, variables can influence each other directly as well 
as indirectly. In order to establish the explanatory power of the variables on voting 
behaviour. we have to distinguish for each the direct effect and the total one (i.e., the 
sum of direct and all indirect effects) on voting behaviour. Table 3 summarizes the direct 
and indirect effects together with the original (zero-order) correlation coefficients. 
Comparison of direct and total effects with the original correlations gives rise to the 
following conclusions: 
The total causal effect of left-right orientation on voting behaviour is very strong. This 
effect is only slightly lower than the original bivariate correlation. This correlation is 
therefore mainly indicative of causality and not of spuriousness. At the same time we 
conclude that the direct effect of left-right orientation on voting behaviour is almost as 
high as the total effect, which means that the other ideological dimensions play almost 
no role whatsoever as intervening factors in this relation. 
For post-materialist value orientation of voters we also notice that the total causal effect 
on voting behaviour is equal to the direct effect, so that the effect is not mediated by other 
variables. But here all resemblance with left-right orientation ends: the effect on voting 
behaviour is significant but very weak, which implies that the original bivariate 
correlation ( - 0.43) is mainly a spurious one. The sign of the effect is in accordance with 
TABLE 3. Correlations with and causal effects on voting behaviour. 
Variable 
Left-right 
Religion 
SES 
Age 
Income 
Post-mat 
Education 
Effects on vote 
Direct Total 
0.64 0.67 
0.15 0.46 
0.15 0.33 
- 0.18 
0.07 0.16 
-0.10 -0.10 
0.05 
Zero order 
correlation 
coefficient 
0.77 
0.47 
0.26 
0.13 
0.14 
- 0.43 
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the theory: a post-materialist value orientation contributes (weakly) to left wing voting 
behaviour. 
For religion we find that the total causal effect on voting behaviour is rather strong and 
equally as high as the bivariate correlation. To a considerable extent this effect is indirect: 
mediated by left-right orientation. The direct effect of religion on voting behaviour is 
statistically significant, but very weak. 
The direct causal effects of the various social background variables on voting behaviour 
are very weak or not significant at all. For all we find that the direct effects are con- 
siderably weaker than the total ones, indicating that their causal influences are largely 
mediated by the three ideological dimensions included in the model. Except for SES we 
also notice that the total effects of these social structural characteristics are weak. 
5. Conclusions Concerning Electoral Alignments 
The analysis in section 4 clearly shows that, although all three ideological dimensions exert 
significant effects on party choice, they differ widely in their relative importance and in their 
role in the entire model. Within the limits of the model analysed in this paper we come to the 
conclusion that: 
*By far the most important ideological dimension is the left-right orientation of voters: 
its effect on voting behaviour is strong and independent of other variables. 
‘The explanatory power of religion is also of considerable importance. although not on 
voting behaviour directly. Religion turns out to be an important antecedent variable for 
left-right orientations, but adds very little to the explanation of voting behaviour. once 
left-right has been included in the model. 
*Post-materialist value orientations can be excluded from models which explain voting 
behaviour without much consequence for their explanatory power. 
*Social background does not exert strong influence on voting behaviour once left-right 
has been included in the model. This is not to say that left-right expresses politically no 
more than one’s place in the social structure, as it remains largely unexplained by back- 
ground and even by the much stronger influence of religion. 
The electoral alignments which played a dominant role in Dutch politics before the 
watershed of the mid-1960s that is, religion and class, have lost quite a bit of their 
structuring power. They can still be regarded as influential (but not dominating) factors in 
party choice, even though most of their influence is indirect. mediated by left-right ideology 
which itself cannot be reduced to merely the channel through which these former align- 
ments express themselves nowadays. The alignment structure which has been so eloquently 
described by Lijphart (1968, 1974) and which was almost an ideal example of Lipset and 
Rokkan’s (1967) thesis of ‘freezing’ of political cleavages since the emergence of modern 
party systems, has largely disappeared. Still, something more than just &alignment has 
taken place, as is witnessed by the large degree in which a single factor, left-right ideology, 
structures party choice.’ Elsewhere we have interpreted this ideological realignment as 
. the political emancipation of individual citizens who can now choose, rather 
than be predestined by social position. Elections have evolved from social- 
accounting systems which register the size of xxial segments, to mechanisms for 
aggregating individual choice into social choice. (van der Eijk and NiemCiller. 
1985: 367) 
Finally, the frequently heralded emergence of post-materialism as a new electoral 
alignment has not materialized in the Netherlands. 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
With respect to the model presented. one could demur that it does not explain party choice 
as such, but the left-right variation in party choice instead. Would not different criteria to 
order party choice result in quite different causal relations and, if so, what is the particular 
relevance of the model presented here? 
The main reason for focusing on variation of how leftward or rightward people vote is that 
this ordering is by far the most important one in Dutch politics. Coalition formation appears 
to be largely governed by it (de Swaan, 1973), and voting of parties and MPs in parliament 
as well (Wolters, 1984). Neither religion, nor post-materialism can even remotely claim 
such influence. Because of its strong influence on a wide variety of politically relevant 
phenomena. the left-right dimension offers better prospects for the integration of theory 
and research in various areas of Dutch politics than other dimensions suggested in the 
literature. 
In addition to this argument it is also possible to demonstrate empirically that other 
orderings of party choice do not necessarily result in findings different from those presented 
here. Rather than taking the left or rightwardness of the vote as the phenomenon to be 
explained we could take as the dependent variable the degree of (post)-materialism the party 
voted for represents. In view of the theories which dominate the field, models attempting to 
account for such variations in (post)-materialist voting behaviour should contain the same 
explanatory variables as used in the analyses reported above. 
To allow for maximally different conclusions between such a model and the one presented 
above, we measured the post-materialist positions of parties in an almost tautological 
manner, namely by the percentage of post-materialists among their voters.G Even ‘stacking 
the deck’ in this way to favour a different ideological orientation does not really improve its 
importance: the direct (and total) effect of post-materialist value orientation on voting 
behaviour reaches only 0.2 1, almost equally low as in our model of section 4. Interestingly 
enough the total effect and even the direct effect of left-right orientation on ‘post- 
materialist-voting’ behaviour are hardly affected and remain very strong (0.63 and 0.55 
respectively). (For more details see Niemoller and van der Eijk, 1986). 
A final point to be made concerns the question why post-materialism turns out to be of 
such marginal importance. In our analyses, we employed the well-known ‘Inglehart’ 
operationalization of post-materialist value orientation. On the basis of this operationaliza- 
tion, value orientation performs poorly in the explanatory model presented above. In our 
opinion there is no ground for considering this dimension as electorally important in the 
Netherlands. It is possible, however, that this result reflects the inappropriateness of 
Inglehart’s operationalization to indicate a ‘dimension’. Time and again, the set of items 
used by Inglehart and others turns out to be not-homogeneous in terms of one underlying 
latent dimension (see van Deth. 1983 and 1984: chapter 5). Therefore, classification of 
voters as pure post-materialists, pure materialist or of a mixed kind, yields a typology rather 
than a one-dimensional attribute. In that case one cannot expect other than weak linear 
relations with other. one-dimensional characteristics. 
For those social scientists who are reluctant to accept our conclusions on the electoral 
insignificance of (post)-materialism in the Netherlands. this argument is at best only a mixed 
blessing. To the extent that it keeps the hypothesis of the relevance of (post)-materialism 
alive (but untested pending better operationalization) it simultaneously undermines the 
validity of a great number of previous research findings (based on the same operationaliza- 
tion), which suggested the relevancy of the concept in the first place. 
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Notes 
Preliminary survey results with respect to the 19S6 parliamentary election in the Netherlands 
suggest that the Influence of religion as a secondary choice criterion is also waning. Whereas in all 
elections, up till and including 1982, it was a very rare phenomenon to find secular voters 
supporting religious parties, such choices appear to have contributed considerably to the electoral 
success of the Christian-Democrats (CDA) in 1986. Between 10 and 15 per cent of the secular 
voters supported the CDA in the elections of 2 1 IMay 1986. If such support proved to be persistent, 
it would turn the CDA much more than ever before into a ‘catch-all’ party which has to compete 
primarily on political (including ideological) grounds. rather than on the basis of social structure. 
See also: van der Eijk, Irwin and Niemiiller (1986), and van der Eijk and van Praag (1987). 
To avoid confusion it should be noted that the sample’s average perception of the location of the 
parties on a left-right scale yields a variable describing analytical properties of a collective, which 
is used as a contextual variable at the level of the individual voter whose party choice is represented 
this way. To explain this choice individuals’ left-right self-placement is used, which is a straight- 
forward property of individuals. Owing to this difference in character between the two variables 
no tautologies are involved in such an explanation even when both variables are, for lack of more 
accurate terms, labelled as ‘left-right’. Further reflections on how and when to use left-right as 
properties of collectives or of individuals can be found in van der Eijk and Niemoller (1983a: 
260-76). 
The data of the Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 1981 are available for secondary analyses 
without restrictions. They can be obtained from Stemmetz Archives (Amsterdam, the INether- 
lands) and from the ICPSR (Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA). The variable names (var. .) mentioned 
in the text refer to the archived datasets and to the published documentation of the study (van der 
Eijk et al., 19Sl). 
When a non-recursive model is specified, the effect of left-right on post-materialism is statistically 
significant, while the effect which runs the other way is not. If, in spite of this, the relation is 
specified-as a causal effect of post-materialism on left-right, the model has to be adapted at a 
number of different places to accommodate this mis-specification. The costs of the entire change are 
not only that fewer degrees of freedom are left (i.e. the model is less parsimonious), but also that 
the fit is considerably worse. 
Left-right may be considered as a new aligning dimension not only because of its strong effect on 
party choice, but also because it has been demonstrated to be relatively stable as an individual and 
as a collective property (refer to van der Eijk and Niemoller, 1983a: 249-54. 285-S 1983b). 
The percentage post-materialists among the voters of each party have been obtained from the 
combined data of Eurobarometers 13-18 (!980- 1982). These data have also been summarized 
by van Deth (1984: 194-5). Details of procedure and results have been reported in Niemoiler and 
van der Eijk (1986). 
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